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Hannibal's Importance in the Second
Punic War
By Steve Nery
Rome eventually won the Second
Punic War, but not until after Hannibal
ravaged Italy for over a decade and won
many huge victories along the way. There is
no doubt that Hannibal was a great
Carthaginian general, at the very least. There
are many factors in war, though, such as the
battle terrain, the size of the armies, and the
competence of each army. The question then
must be asked: How much was the war
influenced by Hannibal himself? By
examining him and other Carthaginian
commanders and their success, as well as the
conditions surrounding their battles, it can
hopefully be proved that Hannibal's role in
the war was a major reason for the
Carthaginians' success for many battles.
Unfortunately, his ineffective grand strategy
also led to the Carthaginians' loss of the war.
First let us examine Hannibal's
exploits. In the winter of 218 B.C., he routed
the Romans at the Battle of Trebbia. After
days of being encamped near each other, the
two forces met when the Romans were
drawn out of their camp by some Numidian
cavalry. Hannibal, having discovered that
the Romans never planned for an ambush in
open ground, dispatched his younger
brother Mago with a small force to surprise
the enemy from behind in the battle. When
the Romans came out, Hannibal brought out
his infantry, numbering some 20,000, up in
one big line, while his cavalry, numbering
10,000, were split up on both sides of the line.
His slingers and pikemen, about 8,000
strong, were located in front of his infantry
and cavalry. Tiberius Sempronius Longus,
the consul in charge of the Romans on that
day, brought out his three lines of infantry,
36,000 strong, and posted his 8,000 cavalry
on the sides. Longus was not an incompetent
man; he had won a small victory over
Hannibal shortly before, but was perhaps a
little too eager to follow it up. He was
probably not quite as good of a commander
as Publius Cornelius Scipio, the other consul.
This battle took place on a flat and treeless
piece of land, so the terrain gave neither side
an advantage in this regard, although
Longus had 6,000 more men than Hannibal.
The battle initially began as a standoff, but
on the sides Hannibal's cavalry outflanked
the enemy's, as would be the case in most
battles. After some heavy fighting, Mago
emerged with his 1,000 infantrymen and
1,000 cavalry and attacked the Romans from
behind. The Romans were routed, as only
10,000 men managed to escape from the
battlefield. Every aspect of this battle seems
to be equal, or even favor the Romans. The
terrain was suited for an even battle, and the
Romans held the strength in numbers. There
is no evidence either that the Carthaginians
were superior to the Romans in fighting
ability, as the battle was at a standstill until
Mago attacked. In fact, the Romans who
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escaped actually fought better than
Hannibal's men, as they "hacked a passage
with the edge of the sword right through the
African center (Livy 82)." The only thing
that won the battle for Hannibal this day was
his brilliant decision to somehow hide a
contingent of his troops in an open field.
Hannibal's next great victory came at
Trasimene the following summer. This time
he faced the consul Gaius Flaminius, who
was not the military equal of his
predecessors. Hannibal knew this and
realized that Flaminius would give him
plenty of opportunities for a pitched battle.
Livy praises Hannibal for this, calling his
reasoning "both far sighted and strategically
sound" and claiming, "there is no more
precious asset for a general than a
knowledge of his opponent's guiding
principles and character (Livy 247)."
Hannibal therefore led his men into a
favorable place for a battle. He marched
through a valley, with Lake Trasimene on his
right, and hills on his left. As Flaminius
followed him, he sent the slingers and
pikemen, as well as the Celts and his cavalry
under cover of the hills during one night.
Flaminius pitched his camp next to the lake,
not far from Hannibal's, just as was expected
from him. At the first sign of dawn the next
day, Flaminius marched his troops into
battle. Once the Romans engaged Hannibal's
contingent, his troops lying in ambush
rushed at the Romans and fell upon them
from every side at once. "In consequence,
most of the troops were cut down while they
were still in marching order and without the
least chance to defend themselves, delivered
up to slaughter (Polybius 250)." About
15,000 Romans died in the valley and another
10,000 were captured, while Hannibal's
losses amounted to no more than 2,500. The
deck was stacked in Hannibal's favor here, as
he chose a favorable spot for battle, and
probably had more men than the Romans,
with his new Gallic allies. He must still be
commended for realizing that the opposing
commander was brash and hungry for battle,
and for plotting another ambush to produce
yet another massacre. While Flaminius was
foolish to fall into the trap, Hannibal was
wise for knowing that he would.
His last and most impressive
complete route came at Cannae in the
summer of 216 B.C. The Romans, led by the
cocky Gaius Terentius Varro and the wiser
Lucius Aemilius Paullus, had a massive force
of 80,000 infantry, and over 6,000 cavalry.
Hannibal, by contrast, had about 40,000 men,
and 10,000 cavalry. Never afraid to sacrifice
his allies, Hannibal put the Celts in the front
lines, in an arched formation, so that the
center of the first line was closer to the
Romans than the sides were. The two armies
clashed on even ground, and Hannibal's
cavalry almost completely destroyed Varro's.
Meanwhile, the Romans defeated the thin
first line and poured through the Celtic and
Spanish center, and rushed triumphantly
towards the Carthaginians. The Romans
came through so heavily that "they then had
both contingents of the African heavy
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infantry on their flanks (Polybius 272)." The
Carthaginian sides both turned inward and
surrounded the Romans. "The result was
exactly what Hannibal had planned: the
Romans, by pressing too far ahead in pursuit
of the Celts were trapped between the two
divisions of Africans (Polybius 272)."
Complete massacre ensued. About 10,000
Romans were captured, and nearly all the
rest, including the consul Paullus, were
killed. Hannibal lost at the most 6,000 men.
This was the worst defeat in Roman history
to this point. Although the Roman army was
inexperienced and one of its generals was
incompetent, it still had a great advantage in
numbers. It was through Hannibal's sacrifice
of his allies that he managed to surround and
route the Romans. Again, his leadership
must be praised.
Hannibal had a knack for short-term
strategies away from battle as well. After the
Battle of Trasimene and before the Battle of
Cannae, eventual war hero Quintus Fabius
Maximus, the "Cunctator," followed
Hannibal around and had him trapped at a
passage in the mountains. Recognizing that
he was in an unfavorable position, and that
his army would most likely lose a battle
there, Hannibal fooled the Romans that
night. Fabius had posted 4,000 of his men in
a pass so as to prevent Hannibal from
escaping. Once darkness set in, Hannibal
had his men tie sticks to 2,000 cattle, light
then, and drive them up the gorge. The
Romans mistook the cattle for a large
Carthaginian force coming at them at full
speed, and retreated. Hannibal subsequently
"brought both his army and his plunder
safely through the gorge (Polybius 260)," and
even rescued 1,000 of his men who had been
taken hostages. Because of his quick
thinking, Hannibal had managed to escape
from a position in which the Romans thought
they had the possibility to end his campaign.
Even in defeat, Hannibal was still an
amazing commander. Although his army
was routed at Zama by Publius Cornelius
Scipio the younger when he was recalled to
Africa, Hannibal still apparently drew up an
ingenious battle formation. Always
spontaneous, he formed his ranks in the
Roman fashion, in three distinct lines. He
placed his elephants in the very front, to try
to cause commotion in the Roman ranks, and
make them lose formation. Unfortunately for
him, the elephants were ineffective, as Scipio
drew his ranks up with gaps in between
maniples so that the elephants would charge
right through. Not only that, but as modern
historian Brian Caven iterates, "The
elephants were in all probability
inadequately trained (Caven 251)." On the
flanks, Hannibal placed his cavalry to
contend with the Romans', but he did not
have the great cavalry upon which he
typically relied to outflank the enemies.
Behind the elephants Hannibal placed the
auxiliaries, including thousands of
mercenaries. These men were placed at the
front to wound the Romans and cause
disorder, so that his veterans (who were in
the second line) could then move up and
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crush the Romans. They were also at the
front to prevent them from running away, as
these men had no loyalty to Carthage. This
too failed, though not by Hannibal's fault.
Livy claims that the mercenaries ran away
and were forced to fight the Carthaginians in
order to make a retreat, while Polybius
blames the Carthaginians for not supporting
the mercenaries. In all probability, Livy is
correct, as Hannibal's trusted veterans never
showed any signs of cowardice in previous
battles, and the mercenaries were more
concerned about getting paid than about
defeating the Romans. Hannibal had no
reason to foresee that the mercenaries would
have to make a path through his own men by
blood; he probably presumed that they
would simply drop back and get out of the
way as the Roman velites commonly did.
Had the mercenaries done their job, the
veterans could have come up and faced a
weakened Roman line. The third line was
composed of his Italian contingent, of whose
loyalty he was unsure. They were therefore
placed some distance back, as to prevent a
problem. This tactic had already worked
before for Hannibal, such as when he was
crossing the Alps with some Gauls. He
placed the Gauls at the rear of his line, by his
best troops, so that an attack by them would
not prove disastrous. More could not have
been asked from Hannibal, with the army
that he had available. Livy writes, "He had
tried everything he could both before and
during the engagement before he withdrew
from the battle, and on the admission even of
Scipio as well as of all the military experts, he
achieved the distinction of having drawn up
his line on that day with remarkable skill
(663)." Polybius and even modern historians
seem to agree with this assessment.
Based on his defeat, it is safe to
conclude that not even Hannibal's genius
could overcome the incompetence of his
army, especially up against as formidable an
adversary as Scipio. While Hannibal had
routed the Roman army thrice before, and
won several other smaller battles, Caven
describes what it was he was lacking at Zama
that his own genius could not make up for:
But at Zama, Hannibal had not
encountered a Longus or a Varro or a
Fulvius; his elephants were not the
noble beasts that had crossed the
Pyrenees, the Rhone and the Alps;
his cavalry, inferior in number, had
apparently no Hasdrubal, Hanno or
Maharbal to lead them; his Balaerie
slingers and Moroccan bowmen
were of little use in hand-to-hand
fighting and in retreat; and his
second line, which might have done
useful work if the mercenaries had
succeeded in driving back the enemy
in disorder, were not the stuff to
stem an advance that was carrying
all before it (253).
If Hannibal had the army that he took with
him into Italy at the beginning of the war, his
strategy at Zama should have worked.
Instead he was left with only one competent
line, that of his veterans, and they were much
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older and less numerous than they were at
Cannae. In all likelihood, no commander
could have defeated Hannibal when he had a
strong army. As we shall see, though, it was
his own fault that he did not have a
competent army raised and ready for the
battle.
Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, was
another Carthaginian commander, but he did
not enjoy nearly the same kind of success
that Hannibal did. His failure should help to
dispel any theories about all of the Barcas
being great generals, or of the Carthaginians
simply being better fighters than the
Romans, and should help show Hannibal's
unique talent. Again, there are several
factors that must be examined to see how
much of an impact Hasrubal had in his
defeats, but it should be clear that many of
his conditions were close to Hannibal's, yet
he could not succeed on the same level as
Hannibal.
Hasdrubal was stationed in Spain in
the year 210 B.C., and Scipio was also in that
area, trying to win the Spaniards over as
allies. Hasdrubal was in command of a force
of about 30,000 Carthaginians and Spaniards,
whom Hannibal had left him in charge of
before crossing the Alps several years before.
Scipio's force also included a large
contingent of Spaniards, whom Hasdrubal
had previously defeated. The two armies
met each other near the town of Baecula after
having been wary of each other for some
time. When Hasdrubal learned of Scipio's
arrival near him, he positioned his men so
that they were protected both by a river and
a steep ridge in front of them. "Scipio when
he came up was eager to give battle, but felt
uncertain as to how to proceed when he saw
what a strong and advantageous position the
enemy had chose (Polybius 421)." He finally
decided to attack, though, alarmed at the
possibility of Hasdrubal meeting up with
Mago or another Carthaginian general.
Scipio sent his best men up the ridge to
attack the Carthaginian covering force. At
this point, Hasdrubal initially did not make
any move, until he saw that his men were
suffering heavy losses. When this occurred,
he led his men out to the brow of the hill,
trusting the strength in their position rather
than any strategy. Scipio sent his light-
armed troops up the hill, and took half of his
army with him to attack the Carthaginians
from the left flank. Hasdrubal was still
leading some of his troops out of camp, as he
had not responded early enough to the
attack. "Up to this moment he had waited
there, trusting to the natural strength of his
position and feeling confident that then
enemy would never venture to attack him,
and so because the flank assault took him by
surprise, he was too late in deploying his
troops (Polybius 421)." When Hasdrubal
saw that he was losing the battle, he escaped
with about 10,000 men. Scipio did not follow
him to route the remaining force, for fear of
running into another Carthaginian general.
This was still a grand success for Scipio,
though, as he had managed to defeat an
army which should have been able to easily
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hold their position if they had only been
ready. The blame for this loss must fall on
Hasdrubal's shoulders, as he had not
prepared his troops for battle, even when he
saw a part of the Roman force climb the ridge
to attack his light armed troops. He had
instead acted too confidently, and did not
realize that the small force climbing the ridge
was simply a diversion. While Scipio's men
were experienced from conquering Spain,
Hasdrubal's men were part of the force that
had initially conquered Spain for Carthage
some years before. With a division of the
same genre of men, Hannibal had enjoyed
great success in Italy to this point.
Hasdrubal had managed to blow this battle
despite his advantage in position and his
army of veterans.
Hasdrubal and the men that he
escaped with then proceeded to cross the
Alps, in a much more successful manner
than Hannibal had. The Romans sent the
consul Marcus Livius Salinator to face
Hasdrubal in northern Italy. Livius was
reinforced with 7,000 of the other consul's
men, to help him win this battle. According
to Livy, when Hasdrubal saw that both
consuls were present on that day, he thought
that they might have already defeated
Hannibal. Accordingly, he determined to
fight this battle to the last man. He had an
army composed of skilled fighters from
Spain, a large number of Gauls, and some
Ligurians. Hasdrubal drew his formation up
so that it was deeper than it was wide, which
made it easier to attack its sides. On the right
side of the lines, Hasdrubal and Nero (the
other consul) clashed. "There, in that sector,
were the two commanders-in-chief, the
greater part of the Roman foot and Roman
horse; there were the veteran Spaniards, wise
in the ways of Roman warfare, and the tough
fighters of Liguria (Livy 492)." Nero was
unable to get directly through Hasdrubal's
men, so he detached part of his forced and
sent them around the side. Once again,
Hasdrubal did not adequately defend for an
attack to the side, and he was outflanked.
Nearly all of his army was killed, including
himself. Polybius and Livy praise him for his
fighting prowess and bravery, as Livy claims,
"There, still fighting, he found a death
worthy of his father Hamilcar and his
brother Hannibal (Livy 493)." While
Hasdrubal had done everything that he
could do as a soldier, he was simply not
nearly as gifted as his brother at
commanding troops. Caven eulogizes him
this way: "A man of very ordinary ability as
a strategist and tactician, he would seem to
have had some administrative capacity but
hardly a spark of the genius or a scrap of the
personal magnetism that made Hannibal
almost unique (Caven 215)." In contrast to
his brother, we see that Hannibal enjoyed far
greater success with the same breed
Carthaginians whom Hasdrubal was in
charge of, as both of their armies were
instrumental in victories in Spain before the
Second Punic War even started. Therefore it
would be foolish to stereotype all of the
Carthaginian generals, or even just the
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Barcas as being superior breed of leaders. It
would also not give Hannibal due credit to
claim that the Carthaginians were just a good
fighting people. Indeed, it took a genius of
Hannibal's caliber to come up with strategies
to defeat Roman armies that were larger than
his own.
As skilled as Hannibal was at
commanding his troops in battle, he failed in
several other exploits necessary to wage a
successful war. One of these failures came
before the war even began. In crossing the
Alps, he lost over half of his men, and many
of his pack animals. As B.D. Hoyos writes,
"This had not been inevitable. As the
Carthaginians well knew, many Gallic
peoples had migrated (with wagons,
families, and animals) across the Alps in both
directions and without disaster, just as a
decade later Hannibal's brother would bring
a new army through in good shape (Hoyos
173)." Granted, neither the Gallic tribes nor
Hasdrubal took as large of a force over the
mountain range, but Hannibal could have
averted disaster if he had timed his
campaign better. Had he crossed the Alps
either before or after the bitter mountain
winter, he may well have been able to bring
fifty to sixty thousand men to Italy in good
shape. With this large of a force, as well as
his Gallic allies, things may have turned out
different.
Another flaw in his strategy lies in
his failure to get reinforced. Carthage did
seek at times to give him fresh troops, as
when he received 4,000 new men in 215 B.C.,
and when Hasdrubal tried to join him.
According to the ancient sources, though,
Hannibal could have been reinforced more if
he wanted to. "Polybius stresses that it was
Hannibal who all these years held the
threads to all theatres of war and diplomacy
in his own hands. Thus it was Hannibal who
allowed himself to do wi thout
reinforcements for years on end (Hoyos
175)." It is interesting to note that thousands
of forces were sent to Spain and Sicily during
the war, places that were not nearly as
crucial as Hannibal's position in Italy.
Perhaps Hannibal was too cocky to think he
needed more troops, or perhaps he did not
wish to ask Carthage for more men, as this
was basically a war that he started with his
own actions in Spain. Either way, his failure
to get more men limited his ability to defend
all his allies in the Italian peninsula and
certainly restricted any possibility of a march
on the city of Rome itself. This failure also
prevented him from maintaining a strong
army, with which he may have been able to
defeat Scipio in Africa.
There was much speculation by the
ancient sources that Hannibal missed his
chance to win the war when he did not
march on Rome after the battle of Cannae.
According to legend, Maharbal, the
commander of the Carthaginian cavalry,
wished to make the march for Rome, and
Hannibal refused. Livy quotes Maharbal as
saying, "You know, Hannibal, how to win a
fight; you do not know how to use your
victory (Livy 151)." Livy goes on to claim,
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"It is generally believed that that day's delay
was the salvation of the City and of the
Empire (Livy 151)." Most modern sources do
not believe that Hannibal's refusal to march
was actually the salvation of Rome, as
Hannibal was not skilled at siege warfare
and perhaps would not have been able to
take the city. Hannibal may also have
expected the Romans to negotiate a treaty to
end the war, as was common after a crushing
defeat in those days. The fact still remains
that in order to win this war, Hannibal
would have needed to take the city of Rome
itself, whether he knew it at the time or not.
Hoyos claims that Maharbal's idea was a
good one, as he wanted to press on with his
cavalry and take the city by surprise (177).
This may well have worked, as the city
would most likely have been in a great deal
of panic after the loss of so many men in the
battle, including one consul and eighty
senators. There is also the matter that the
Romans did not have a skilled veteran army
to defend the city either. Whether or not
Hannibal could have taken the city cannot be
proclaimed for sure, but if there was one
time in the war in which he had a good
chance at it, this was that time.
It seems that with Hannibal's grand
strategy for the war, he should have taken
the chance of attacking Rome and ending the
war in a single battle. After the Romans
declined to negotiate following their loss at
Cannae, he must have known how hard the
Romans were determined to fight. He could
not win a long drawn-out war, for he did not
acquire the men to defend all of his allies in
Italy, nor could he count on them all
remaining loyal. Only by keeping the energy
he generated at Cannae constant could he
have counted on keeping his allies. By
slowing the war down after the battle, this
possibility was lost.
It is safe to conclude that Carthage's
initial success in the Second Punic War was
because of Hannibal's brilliance as a leader.
With a good army at his service, nobody in
his time was his equal. His remarkable skill
was not enough to make up for an
incompetent army, though, such as the one
he commanded at the Battle of Zama. He
was also not the best at making up a grand
strategy. Although his idea of winning over
allies in Italy seemed like a good one, as it
would get him more troops, it also meant
that he had to spread himself too thin all
their cities. Eventually, he was not able to
defend any of them. He also failed at
maintaining a good army, although he had
the opportunity to do so. Therefore his role
in the war can be assessed thus: his strategies
were what won several huge victories over
the Romans at the beginning (and lesser
victories later on, as the Romans refused to
fight any more huge pitched battles), but his
flawed grand strategy also helped lead to
Carthage's defeat in the end.
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